Abstract: This chapter discusses the political, economic, and humanitarian motives driving Chinese aid. Concerning the political drivers, the Chinese government uses aid as a foreign policy tool, which should help the country to create a favorable international environment for China's development, support the country's rise to global power status, influence global governance, and reward countries that abide by the One-China Policy. Moreover, aid has increasingly been used to promote trade with developing countries and loans are extended in exchange for natural resources. Finally, China emphasizes that it gives aid in order to help other developing countries to reduce poverty and improve people's livelihoods, a claim supported by the data as poorer countries receive more support. While the mixture of political, economic and humanitarian goals does not set China apart from the so-called "traditional" Western donors, China differs in the detailed content of its interests and the explicit emphasis on "mutual benefit" in the pursuance of its goals.
Introduction
China's rising aid has led to a controversial international debate about the supposedly adverse effects of China's activities in the developing world. This appears to have taken the Chinese government by surprise-not least because it had considered foreign aid as a tool to project China's image as a "responsible stakeholder" (Chen 2010 (Chen , 2011 ). Yet, China's international aid activities are neither reported to international organizations, nor has Beijing released an official and comprehensive aid database. It is particularly this lack of transparency in the Chinese aid system that has been criticized widely, both outside and inside China. While Western perceptions often assume deliberate secrecy (e.g., Brautigam 2009 : 2), Chinese scholars have attributed it to the system's high complexity and fragmentation (Hu and Huang 2012; Huang and Ren 2012; Cao 2013; Hu 2013) . Either way, the lack of transparency has fueled speculation about Beijing's motives.
China's aid motives cannot be understood without a thorough understanding of the long history of its aid program. Although China is often referred to as an 'emerging' or 'new' donor (e.g., Manning 2006; Walz and Ramachandran 2011; Hernandez 2017) , its aid history can be traced back to the early days of the People's Republic.
1 Yet, as Mawdsley (2012: 262) has put it, the 'Western imaginative geographies' of foreign aid have, for the most part, failed to recognize the substantial presence of China. China, in fact, started giving aid in the early 1950s, first to North Korea to support the reconstruction after the Korean War, and shortly afterwards to Vietnam and other then recently de-colonized neighbors to the South and Southwest, to ensure their independence and develop friendly relations (Lin 1993 (Lin , 1996 . Cambodia, Nepal, and Egypt were the first non-communist recipient countries in 1956 (Bartke 1989) . 2 To depict the geographical expansion of China's aid, Figure 1 shows a world map illustrating the year of each recipient country's first aid project by decade.
In 1956 China's first Premier Zhou Enlai named "mutual benefit" (together with mutual respect for national sovereignty) as the guiding principle of Chinese aid and economic cooperation, and linked it to the Soviet aid model, of which China was a recipient: Beijing Action Plan, and also to establish a US$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund (FOCAC 2006) . China has indeed continuously increased its commitments and today it is one of the world's most important providers of development finance. Over the 2000-2014 period, AidData was able to trace more than 4,300 projects in 140 countries and territories (Dreher et al. 2017) . The total financial value of these projects exceeded US$350 billion, which means that China's development finance is almost as large as the United States' US$ 395 billion. Chinese and US development finance may be of a similar size, but they differ substantially in their composition: less than one quarter of China's finance could be categorized as official development assistance (ODA) as defined by the OECD (compared to 93% of US development finance).
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This brief outline of the history of Chinese aid highlights three broad factors driving its aid giving: political motives (e.g., striving for recognition), commercial interests (such as trade and investment promotion), and humanitarian concerns (most notably the desire to support other developing countries' welfare). In this respect, China's aid is not special, as can be seen in the 5 exhaustive literature on the role of political, economic, and humanitarian interests in aid allocation by the so-called "traditional" Western donors and the international financial institutions (e.g., Schraeder et al. 1998; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Vreeland and Dreher 2014) . However, China differs in the detailed content of its interests and the explicit emphasis on "mutual benefit" in the pursuance of its political, economic, and developmental goals.
This chapter provides an overview of the literature that analyzes China's aid motives in scholarly contributions in political science, economics, development studies, and sinology. We begin by analyzing Beijing's political motives, followed by sections on its commercial interests and humanitarian drivers. The final section concludes with a summary of the findings and provides suggestions for future research on China's foreign aid.
Political Motives
In the literature on political motives of Western donors a broad consensus has emerged that aid money supports political allies, punishes enemies, helps build coalitions, and is aimed at improving public opinion in recipient countries (e.g., Morgenthau 1962; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Dreher et al. 2008 Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Vreeland and Dreher 2014) . 8 The language of Chinese politics is highly coded; tifa are formalized political expressions, which are characterized by a particular quality of linguistic impoverishment (something like Newspeak). They are an essential part of Chinese politics and help constitute the structure of power within China's political system (Schoenhals 1992 Econometric results by Dreher and Fuchs (2015) The importance of a country's stance towards the One-China Policy for Chinese aid allocation has been maintained up to the present day. Taiwan's democratic transition in the late 1980s heated up the "checkbook diplomacy" of both Taipei and Beijing (Brautigam 2010) . When Taiwan attempted to re-enter the UN in September 1993, all those countries who rejected Taiwan's case-with the exception of Russia, India and Slovakia-were recipients of Chinese aid in the early 1990s (Lin 1996: 53-54). Even today, China uses aid to reward countries that abide by the One-China Policy and do not recognize the government in Taipei China provides less official financing to countries with diplomatic ties to the government in Taipei and that this effect is more pronounced for ODA compared to less concessional other official flows.
Gaining support in international organizations
Although China succeeded in joining the UN in 1971, foreign aid remained a tool for securing the political support of developing countries in times of conflict between China and the West. When
China was faced with economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation by many states after the crackdown of Tiananmen Square student protests in June 1989, its foreign aid commitments increased by around one third from US$223.5 million (1989) to US$374.6 million (1990) (Lin 1996: 37) . While the total financial value was still far below the level of the early 1970s, the number of aid recipients increased with China trying to reach as many countries as possible (Lin 1996) . This is also very visible in the sudden increase of aid recipients in 1989 and 1990 displayed in Figure 2 . Taylor (1998: 450) Figure 3 shows that countries that vote in line with
Beijing in the UNGA indeed receive more Chinese aid projects per year on average.
Projecting a good international image
Going hand in hand with the above is China's motive to project an image of itself as a responsible stakeholder in international politics. The tifa "responsible great power" is very often mentioned in and how to deal with China's rising power-a statement representative of the wider discourse on whether China will be a supporter or a challenger to the existing global order-have often been framed in China as the "China Threat Theory" (Jin 2009 ). The latter is perceived by the Chinese government as potentially inhibiting to China's "peaceful" rise. Therefore, foreign aid is employed as a tool to improve China's image abroad-or, as the Chinese government officially frames it, "to promote friendly relations" with other countries (e.g., SCIO 2011). As Luo (2016) writes, foreign aid represents China's contribution to international society, shows "big power responsibility" and helps to win the approval of international society for China's rise. It is also, he follows, the soft power needed for a "rising power." Empirical evidence on Latin America, however, does not show that choice of development path and social systems" (e.g., Xi 2015), there is in fact a clear vision of how that development should happen: through "alignment of development strategies," "macro-economic coordination," and using the NDB, AIIB, and the Belt and Road Initiative (Rudyak 2017a) . For China, this does not mean challenging the established international economic order but taking a lead in its reform-with foreign aid as a means to gain support.
Commercial Interests
After Mao Zedong's death, economic modernization and development replaced ideology as the core driver of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. This also translated into foreign aid policies, where from the early 1980s on, economic motives began to play an increasingly important role. While the idea of "mutually beneficial" relationships was (as we have seen above) by no means new, in the era of Deng Xiaoping it gained a new economic dimension. This renewed focus is also very visible in the data. Dreher and Fuchs (2015) find that, in contrast to earlier periods, the number of Chinese aid 
Opening the international markets to Chinese enterprises -"Going Out"
Appropriating its experience with the Japanese model, China began to use aid to promote trade and investment (Shimomura and Wang 2012) . In 1992 China piloted foreign aid joint ventures that combined aid with trade and investment (Huang and Liu 2013: 65) interests to a larger degree than highly concessional development aid, i.e., aid in the strict sense.
Securing access to natural resources
China's "growth miracle" (Lin et al. 2003) After disentangling ODA from other less concessional forms of Chinese official financing, it appears that only less concessional forms of official financing (rather than aid in the strict sense) are guided by the availability of oil in recipient countries.
Developmental and Humanitarian Concerns
Throughout the history of Chinese aid, official documents and leadership statements have continuously maintained that China gives aid in order to help other developing countries to "strengthen their independent development capabilities" (Xi 2015) , to "reduce poverty," and to "improve people's livelihoods" (SCIO 2014) . The heavy focus of Chinese foreign aid on physical infrastructure, for example, is grounded in Chinese leaders' belief that it was essential for economic development (Zhang et al. 2015) . Phus, China's foreign aid could also reflect developmental and "Humanitarian Aid" is one of the means by which the objective of "Improving People's livelihood" can be achieved. It is defined primarily as aid given as emergency response to natural disasters, post-disaster reconstruction, and capacity building for disaster prevention and relief.
Chinese humanitarian aid, however, is delivered on a rather "ad-hoc" basis. 12 As has been shown by Li (2012) and the UNDP (2015), its scale depends on the seriousness of the crisis itself; the host-12 See also Fuchs and Klann (2013) for an econometric analysis of the allocation and speed of disaster aid by non-DAC donors, including China. points." Despite these advances, there is still a long way to go before we can fully grasp the consequences of China's development activities for growth and welfare in recipient countries.
Conclusions
This chapter discussed political, economic, and humanitarian motives as drivers of China's foreign aid to other developing countries. Concerning the political drivers, the Chinese government explicitly names aid as a foreign policy tool that should help the country to create a favorable international environment for its development and support its rise to global power status. This stance reveals the interdependent relationship between Chinese foreign and domestic motives, as China's economic modernization and growth are seen as prerequisites for China's emergence as an economic and political power-and necessary to maintain the legitimacy and power of the Chinese Communist Party. Since China first began giving aid, it has been used as a tool to increase Beijing's influence in global governance, particularly in the institutions of the UN, and to reward countries that abide by the One-China Policy. Furthermore, foreign aid has served and continues to serve as a tool to improve China's image abroad-or, as the Chinese government officially frames it, "to promote friendly relations" with other countries.
Commercial interests began to play a role in the 1980s with China's "Reform and Opening
Up," when economic modernization and development replaced ideology as the core driver of in terms of China's own economic interests. This idea was further developed in the 1990s when
Chinese aid was intended to also support Chinese companies' "going out." When China became the world's second largest oil importer in 2000, it started to increasingly provide loans in exchange for natural resources to increase its energy security. However, empirical results suggest that it is not China's ODA but rather the large-scale loans handed out by the country's policy banks that are targeted at resource-rich countries.
Finally, China's foreign aid can also be understood as a reflection of humanitarian and developmental motives. Throughout the history of Chinese aid, its officials have continuously maintained that China gives aid in order to help other developing countries to reduce poverty and improve recipient populations' livelihoods. Economic growth is understood as the primary engine for development. Indeed, quantitative research shows that poorer countries receive more Chinese aid and that more disaster-affected countries receive more humanitarian assistance, all else being equal.
However, it has also been shown that poorer areas within countries receive less assistance from
Beijing.
Obviously, these three major motives of Chinese aid are intertwined and their relative importance has been changing over the history of China's aid program and continues to evolve.
Under the current Chinese leadership of President Xi, foreign aid is receiving increasingly more attention as a foreign and economic policy tool. A substantial evidence of this development is the repeated calls for "strengthening" and "reform" of the Chinese aid system (e. Chinese aid system is highly fragmented. Although MOFCOM is designated as the coordinating institution for foreign aid, it does not exercise authority with respect to other over 20 government ministries and agencies involved in foreign aid (Rudyak 2014 ). Yet, as the volume of Chinese aid continues to grow, the issue of reform is becoming more pressing. In early February 2017, the currently highest decision-making body for economic reforms, the Communist Party's Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform, which was established by Xi Jinping after his succession to power, passed the "Implementation Guidelines for the Reform of Foreign Aid" (Rudyak 2017b) . It was the very first time that the Leading Group took on the issue of aid, presumably-as Xi has been quoted afterwards-because the leadership understood that "China must act more wisely when giving money to foreign countries" and need to optimize the strategic layout of foreign aid (Huang 2017) .
Considering the rising importance of Chinese aid, the existing bodies of qualitative research, including the in-depth analysis of primary (Chinese language) sources, and quantitative research, including thorough analyses of recently published data, are very limited. While quantitative research has revealed a correlation between China's aid allocation patterns and proxies for its political interests, the literature on the political effects of Chinese aid is still underdeveloped. 15 Given the scarcity of research, more light should be shed at the role of influential state-owned enterprises and party ties of private companies for the selection of Chinese aid projects. 16 Future research should also seek to closer investigate subnational allocation patterns and distributional consequences of China's aid in recipient countries. Finally, the analysis of the effects of China's development footprint on development outcomes other than economic growth deserves more attention.
15 See Bader (2015a , 2015b , Hernandez (2017) , and for recent exceptions. 16 See Zhu (2015) for first qualitative evidence. Source: Own figure with data from Lin (1996) and Dreher et al. (2017) . 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
